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 A NEW WORLD ORDER: THE EXPANSION OF EXECUTIVE CORPORATE 
LIABILITY IN THE LIFE SCIENCES INDUSTRY. 
By 
Rachel M. Jones 
The government has recently expanded regulation in industries where consumers 
have become vulnerable.  The sensational betrayals of the pharmaceutical industry
1
 and 
banking system have put government officials on high alert.  The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and Office of the Inspector General (OIG) have made record settlements with 
pharmaceutical companies based on allegations of drug misbranding, off-label 
promotion, false claims and kickbacks.
2
  Similarly, we have seen the passage of the Dodd 
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 after the mortgage crisis 
revealed the banking industries abuse and indiscretions related to mortgage underwriting, 
predatory lending and mortgage-backed securities issuance.
3
  The fundamental tenant of 
capitalism is free market enterprise.  However, the free market principle in democratic 
America has consistently shown that without the appropriate amount of government 
                                                        
1 This writing will use the terms pharmaceutical industry and life science industry 
interchangeably.  
2 See Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 
billion in FCA Cases in Fiscal Year 2011, (December 19, 2011). See generally, United States 
Department of Justice FCA Fraud Statistics, http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-
FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf. 
3 Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 (2010). 
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regulation and oversight there can be far reaching and irreparable harm to the American 
consumer and economy. 
The government has implemented various forms of governance and oversight 
over the pharmaceutical industry.  There has been an attempt by the government to set 
standards, monitor compliance and enforce compliance on those who are in violation.
4
 
Government action is not the only model of setting standards for a regulatory system.  In 
the life science industry, monitoring of compliance with laws is done in a broader context 
to include self-regulation by the organization through compliance programs.
5
  A robust 
compliance program is a company’s first line of defense in deterring violations of fraud 
and abuse laws. 
There is also a private component of regulation of the life science industry 
through qui tam lawsuits under the False Claims Act (“FCA”)6.  The FCA generally 
prohibits individuals and entities from the filing of a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment by the United States.
7
  Qui tam lawsuits are brought by private individuals who 
are not associated with the government but have some knowledge of wrongdoing by an 
alleged violator under the FCA (these individuals are also known as whistleblowers or 
quit tam relators).
8
  Qui tam lawsuits are a powerful form of governance since there is a 
significant financial reward for a qui tam relator if they are successful in proving the 
                                                        
4 See generally Scott Burris, Michael Kempa, Clifford Shearing, Changes in Governance: A 
Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 Akron L. Rev. 143 (2008). 
5 See generally, Michael A. Cassidy, Health Care Compliance Manual (2001). 
6 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733 (1863). 
7 Cassidy, supra note 5, at §11-03(6). 
8 Id. 
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violations under the FCA.
9
  In 2011, qui tam cases accounted for 92% of all FCA 
recoveries. In addition, qui tam litigation recovered $2.8 billion in 2011.
10
  
In 1958, the life science industry formed the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), an advocacy organization representing research-
based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.  A part of the mission of the 
organization is to create standard procedures to better facilitate interactions with 
healthcare professionals. To that end, over 60 members have signed a code of ethics that 
governs relationships and interactions with healthcare professionals.
11
  Governing 
relationships with healthcare professionals is necessary to eradicate potential healthcare 
fraud and abuse violations. 
In general, the impact of such systems for regulation has not offered the best 
results, “the regulation literature has confirmed that the most powerful corporate actors 
have been able to hijack weak systems of accountability in service of their own ends.”12 
Based on the governments increased surveillance of the life science industry it would 
seem that the regulation model has not significantly deterred healthcare fraud and abuse 
violations. The expansion of the governments’ prosecution of corporate executives under 
the Park doctrine and the exclusion statute is further evidence that the regulation model is 
not working well in the life science industry.  
                                                        
9 Id. 
10 Department of Justice, supra note 2. 
11 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 
http://www.phrma.org/about/phrma. 
12 Burris, supra note 4 at 148. 
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This writing will discuss specifically the different forms of governance being 
utilized to enforce the healthcare laws in the life science industry. This will include 
specific cases enforcing the Park doctrine
13
 and corporate responsibility on 
pharmaceutical executives, the FDA’s non-binding prosecution procedures for Park 
doctrine cases, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) restriction of an 
individual’s ability to do business with the government, and mandatory compliance 
programs for healthcare entities.  
The government has publicly made several comments by top officials indicating 
their desire to prosecute executives under the Park doctrine. Commissioner Margaret 
Hamburg wrote in a letter to Senator Charles Grassley on March 4, 2010, that the Office 
of Criminal Investigations (“OCI”) of the FDA recommends increasing misdemeanor 
violations as an enforcement tool under the Act. The letter specifically indicates the 
desire to increase prosecution under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
14
  The 
following month, Eric Blumberg, the FDA’s deputy chief counsel for litigation also 
confirmed at the Food Drug and Law Institute Annual Conference, the FDA’s desire to 
increase prosecution under the Park doctrine.
15
  With the current state of increased 
regulation and oversight, the government is pushing the legal boundary for liability of 
companies within the life science industry.   
                                                        
13 This paper will use the terms Park doctrine and Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) 
doctrine interchangeably. 
14 Letter from Margaret Hamburg, Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration to 
Senator Charles Grassley (March 4, 2010), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-
re-GAO-report-on-OCI.pdf. 
15 Food Drug and Law Institute Annual Conference, April 22, 2010, See also, infra note p. 
Washington Business Information, Inc.,  
 4 
The government has begun to explore and effectively prosecute pharmaceutical 
executives under the Park doctrine.  The Park doctrine was established in the 1975 
Supreme Court case, United States v. Park.
16
  In this case, Acme Markets, Inc., a national 
retail grocery chain and the chief executive officer of the chain were charged with 
violating 21 USCS § 301(k) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or 
Act).
17
  This section of the Act refers to the alteration of a food, drug, device, tobacco 
product or cosmetic when held for sale and placed in interstate commerce and results in 
such article being adulterated or misbranded.
18
  The government alleged that the 
company and CEO caused interstate food shipments to be exposed to rodent 
contamination in their warehouse.
19
 The Act imposes a misdemeanor penalty on anyone 
who violates §301.
20
 The strict liability interpretation of this statute as it relates to 
corporate executives is controversial. 
The Supreme Court in Park reversed the Appeals Court decision because the 
Court held that a corporate officer could be found guilty under the Act if there is a 
responsible relation to the situation.
21
  The Court further looked at United States v. 
Dotterweich, where they determined that the Act imposes upon persons exercising 
authority and supervisory responsibility in an organization not only a positive duty to 
seek out and remedy violations but also, a duty to implement measures that will insure 
                                                        
16 421 U.S.C. 658 (1975). 
17 Id. at 660. 
18 21 U.S.C. 301(k). 
19 421 U.S.C. 662 (1975). 
20 21 U.S.C. 303(a). 
21 421 U.S.C. 667 (1975).  
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that violations will not occur. 
22
.  The Park court continued to follow Dotterweich, in that 
a person found in violation of the Act does not have to be aware of some wrongdoing.  A 
wrongful action might be “gross negligence and inattention in discharging corporate 
duties and obligations or any of a host of other acts of commission or omission which 
would cause the contamination of food.”23  However, the Supreme Court specifically 
reviewed whether the government has to make a prima facie case of some “wrongful 
action”. 24 The Supreme Court reasoned that the Act imposes a strict liability on 
responsible corporate agents who deal with products that affect the health of consumers.
25
  
The Supreme Court in Park noted that the penal sanctions were rigorous, however a 
defendant can pursue an affirmative defense that they were “powerless” to prevent or 
correct the violation.
26
  The strict liability implication of the statute is a very serious 
concern of executives of pharmaceutical companies that may have responsibility under 
the Act.  
The Supreme Court first addressed the doctrine of criminal liability for 
“responsible corporate officers” in United States v. Dotterweich.27  Joseph Dotterweich 
served as the President of the Buffalo Pharmacal Company.  This company distributed 
manufactured drugs, which were repackaged under their own label and resold to the 
public.  The government charged both the company and Mr. Dotterweich with shipping a 
                                                        
22 Id. at 672. 
23 Christopher Hall and Gregory Schwab, Counseling Responsible Corporate Officers in a New 
Age of Government Food and Drug Enforcement, 34 Champion 41 (2010). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 42. 
26 Id. 
27 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
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misbranded drug and shipping and adulterated drug under Section 301(a) of the Act.
28
  
The trial court convicted Mr. Dotterweich on all counts charged but disagreed as to the 
company’s culpability.   
The Second Circuit reversed the lower courts decision on the ground that 
Congress did not intend to have Section 301(a) of the Act apply to individuals based on 
their interpretation of a “good faith” exception set forth in Section 303(c).29  The “good 
faith” exception applied to individuals who received a guaranty from the manufacturers 
that the drugs were approved by the FDA and not misbranded or adulterated in any 
way.
30
  The Second Circuit inferred that Congressional intent was not to apply the 
misdemeanor provisions of the Act to individuals because individual employees do not 
obtain guarantees.
31
  The Second Circuit reasoned that it would be unfair to hold 
individual employees accountable based on their company’s failure to obtain a guaranty. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Act.  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that Congress passed the Act to keep adulterated and 
misbranded drugs out of the channels of commerce and created severe penalties for 
disobedience.
32
  “The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and 
health of people which, in circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond 
                                                        
28 Id. at 278. 
29 Id. at 284. See also, Christopher Hall and Gregory Schwab, Counseling Responsible 
Corporate Officers in a New Age of Government Food and Drug Enforcement, 34 Champion 41 
(2010). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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self-protection”.33  The penalties serve as an “effective means of regulation” and 
“dispensed with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some 
wrongdoing”.34  The Supreme Court stated that “in the interest of the larger good [the 
legislation] puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but 
standing in responsible relation to a public danger”.35   
The Supreme Court recognized the hardship imposed on corporate officers with 
the imposition of such a strict liability. “Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute 
which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally 
wanting.”36 Congress, however, “has preferred to place [the hardship] upon those who 
have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions 
imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to 
throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless”.37  
Section 303 of the Act, imposes a penalty for violations of Section 301. A person 
who violates the Act may be imprisoned for not more than a year or fined not more than 
$1,000 or both.
38
  In Park, the respondent was sentenced to pay a mere fine of $250.  As 
we have seen in more recent pharmaceutical cases where the Park doctrine is imposed, 
the government is requesting the maximum fine and prison terms.  
                                                        
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 21 U.S.C.S. §303(a). 
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In addition, the government has become increasingly vigilant in their 
prosecutions, such that they have begun to piggy-back with an application to exclude 
those who were found guilty under the Park doctrine from participation in federal health 
care programs. This exclusion can have severe repercussions for corporate executives 
with careers focused in the healthcare field. “When an individual is excluded, federal 
health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid will not pay for any item or service 
furnished, ordered, or prescribed by that individual. Entities that employ an excluded 
individual for providing items or services to federal program beneficiaries are subject to 
monetary penalties, making exclusion a de facto ban on working in the health care 
industry.”39  
The Social Security Act allows for exclusion from participation in federal 
healthcare programs.
40
  The Secretary of the DHHS is required to exclude individuals or 
entities from participation under certain circumstances and has discretion to exclude 
individuals or entities under other circumstances.
41
  Felony offenses relating to fraud and 
felony offenses relating to the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance require 
exclusion.  Misdemeanor convictions, however, fall within the permissive category.
42
 The 
secretary may exclude individuals convicted of misdemeanors relating to fraud or relating 
to the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance.   
                                                        
39 Letter from Washington Legal Foundation to Eric Blumberg, deputy chief counsel of 
litigation, FDA (October 26, 2010). 
40 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a) – 7(b)(1)-(16). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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Based on the Purdue case discussed below, the Secretary has taken the position 
that an RCO conviction based on the promotion of a misbranded drug is a misdemeanor 
conviction relating to both fraud and a controlled substance.
43
  The government also 
intends to exclude individuals who fail to act when they are under a duty to act and the 
inaction relates to any acts referred to in the exclusion statute.
44
  The exclusion statute 
creates a presumptive exclusion period of three years for misdemeanor convictions 
relating to fraud or controlled substances.
45
  The Secretary has discretion to apply a 
different period in accordance with published regulations if mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances apply.  Aggravating circumstances for individuals convicted of a 
misdemeanor relating to fraud include (1) acts that caused, or reasonably could have 
caused a governmental program to incur a loss of $5,000 or more, (2) acts committed 
over a period of one or more years, (3) acts that had a significant adverse effect on 
physical or mental well-being of individuals or other program beneficiaries. Mitigating 
circumstances for this class of misdemeanor violations include, (1) conviction of three or 
fewer offenses and less than $1500 in financial loss, (2) cooperation.  There are similar 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the secretary for misdemeanor 
convictions relating to controlled substances.
46
 
Now that the government is expanding corporate executive liability to include 
exclusion from the federal healthcare programs, executives must consider how to protect 
themselves under the exclusion statute. Executives should consider implementing the 
                                                        
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Hall, infra note 23, at 44. 
 10 
compliance and quality control measures.  In addition, executives should develop 
processes within their company that will combat the exclusion statutes aggravating 
factors.  When considering the aggravating factor of long duration, an executive can 
implement annual audits of specific risk areas.  In monitoring patient impact, an 
executive should allocate resources to compliance based on the safety issues.  In 
assessing the financial impact, an executive should also consider allocating resources to 
compliance based on the revenue that a product generates from government programs.  In 
preventing second violations, an executive should implement root cause analysis for all 
significant compliance violations.  Lastly, a robust compliance program whereby the 
executives are actively engaged will help in protecting against an RCO prosecution where 
there is an underlying felony charge.
47
  These types of best practices are necessary in 
protecting executives against the extensive reach of the Park doctrine.  
The OIG also intends to expand the application of the exclusion statute as it 
relates to executives of large complex organizations.
48
  One of the permissive exclusions 
is based on individuals who control a sanctioned entity.  If an individual owns or has 
ownership control in a sanctioned entity or is an officer or managing employee then the 
secretary can exclude them based on the sanctioned company.
49
  The individual does not 
have to be convicted of any civil or criminal statute in order for this exclusion to apply.
50
 
During Congressional testimony, Inspector General Daniel Levinson, stated the OIG has 
                                                        
47 Id. at 60. 
48 Preventing Health Care Fraud: New Tools and Approaches to Combat Old Challenges, 
Hearing Before the United States Senate Committee on Finance (2010) (testimony of 
Inspector General Daniel Levinson).  
49 42 USC 1320a-7(b)(15). 
50 Id. 
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historically only applied this exclusion to small companies but will now start to apply it 
more broadly to larger organizations. 
51
  For example, the OIG excluded the owner of 
Ethex Corporation for 20 years based on the exclusion of the company.  Ethex plead 
guilty to felony criminal charges after it failed to inform the FDA that it was 
manufacturing oversized tablets of two prescription drugs.
52
  However, the most 
controversial case involving exclusion from government programs and the Park doctrine 
is the Purdue Frederick Company case.  
Purdue Case 
In May 2007, Purdue Frederick, a subsidiary of Purdue Pharma L.P., (“Purdue”) 
pled guilty to felony misbranding of Oxycontin as part of a settlement with federal 
prosecutors.
53
 Misbranding is when a product’s label is incomplete, false or misleading.54  
A product’s label can include written, printed, or graphic matter that appears on the 
product or its container.  It also includes information that accompanies the product, such 
as advertisements for the product.
55
  Purdue falsely marketed Oxycontin as posing a 
lower risk of abuse and addiction than non-time released painkillers.
56
  
                                                        
51 Preventing Health Care Fraud: New Tools and Approaches to Combat Old Challenges, 
Hearing Before the United States Senate Committee on Finance (2011) (testimony of 
Inspector General Daniel Levinson).  
52 Id. 
53 Michael Friedman, et al. v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of Health and 
Human Services, et al., No. 09-2028 (December 13, 2010). 
54 21 U.S.C. 501. 
55 21 U.S.C. 301(k). 
56 Friedman, supra note 53. 
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There were also three executives of the company that pled guilty to misdemeanor 
misbranding under the Park doctrine for their failure to prevent Purdue’s fraudulent 
marketing of Oxycontin. The corporate executives included Michael Friedman, the 
president, Howard Udell, general counsel and Dr. Paul Goldenheim, the medical director. 
In their plea agreements, the executives disclaimed any actual knowledge of fraudulent 
marketing of Oxycontin but admitted to failing to discharge their “responsibility and 
authority to prevent in the first instance or to promptly correct the misrepresentations 
certain unnamed Purdue employees made regarding Oxycontin.”57   
Several months after the executives pled guilty, the OIG, the main enforcement 
agency for the FFDCA determined that the executives “should be excluded from 
participation in Federal health care programs for 20 years, pursuant to 42 USC §1320a-
7(b)(1) which permits the DHHS to exclude an individual convicted of a misdemeanor 
related to fraud.” 58 This restriction period was later reduced to 12 years, however the 
executives appealed the exclusion based on the interpretation of whether failure to act as 
“responsible corporate officers” (RCO) and making a plea for misdemeanor misbranding 
constituted a “misdemeanor relating to fraud”.59  The executives further argued that their 
pleas under the Park doctrine do not reflect any personal wrongdoing and that excluding 
them from participation in all federal health care programs is inconsistent with the law. 
                                                        
57 Ropes and Gray, DC Circuit Holds That Former Purdue Pharma Executives Who Pleaded 
Guilty to Misdemeanor Misbranding May Be Excluded From Participation in Federal Health 
Care Programs, (August 1, 2012). 
58 D.C. Circuit Affirms HHS Power to Disqualify Corporate Officials Convicted of Misdemeanors 
Under the “Responsible Corporate Official (RCO) Doctrine, Mondaq, (April 14, 2012). 
59 Id. 
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After years of litigation, on July 27, 2012, the Court of Appeals upheld the DHHS 
exclusion of the Purdue executives.
60
  The DC circuit judges were not dissuaded by the 
argument of the professional careers of these men.  The court realized that the plaintiffs 
are free to seek private employment at a company that does not rely on federal or state 
funds.
61
  This case is a first of its kind and based on the public remarks by the FDA, there 
is a significant push to “criminally charge individuals at all levels in the company”62 
because even the large monetary settlements from the drug companies for FDA violations 
has not adequately deterred off-label promotion and misbranding.  
Synthes Case 
In November 2011, four key executives of Synthes North America (“Synthes”), a 
medical device company based in West Chester, PA were sentenced to prison for charges 
related to health care fraud.
63
  The government charged the company with unlawful 
clinical trials and the executives were charged under the RCO doctrine.
64
  Synthes is the 
first case where the court has sentenced the executives of the company to jail time. The 
court felt that the egregious actions and disregard for human life shown by the company 
and executives was indicative to prison time.
65
  According to the prosecution, Synthes 
officials wanted to beat their competitors to market without going through the rigorous 
FDA new drug approval process for their bone cement product.  Instead, the Synthes 
                                                        
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Supra note 39. 
63 Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Former Executives of International Medical 
Device Maker Sentenced to Prison in Unlawful Clinical Trials Case (November 21, 2011). 
64 Id. 
65 Peter Loftus, Former Synthes Officers Receive Prison Sentences, Wall Street Journal (2011). 
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officials conspired to train select surgeons in its off-label use and then have the 
physicians publish their findings.
66
  Off-label promotion of a drug is promoting a drug for 
a purpose, which has not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
67
  Before 
a pharmaceutical company can market a drug in the United States they must go through a 
rigorous application and clinical trial process to test the safety and efficacy of the drug 
they wish to market.  Due to the cost and length of time to bring a new drug to market, 
most drug manufacturers will only seek approval for one type of use of the drug.
68
  If 
alternative uses are discovered during clinical trials or once the drug is being widely used 
by the public then the drug manufacturer must begin the drug approval process again for 
this new use. Historically, drug manufacturers have been charged with illegally 
promoting and misbranding a drug because they employed marketing and sales tactics, 
which suggested to physicians that they could use a particular drug for non-approved 
medical purposes.  In the United States, physicians are generally allowed to prescribe a 
drug or a combination of drugs for off-label purposes to their patient if they believe it is 
their best course of treatment. 
In the Synthes case, this illegal promotion program continued even after patients 
died in surgery in Texas and California.
69
  The patients suffered shard drops in blood 
pressure after the bone cement compound was injected into their spines.
70
 The program 
was not halted until a third death occurred in California.  These deaths were never 
                                                        
66 Id. 
67 Infra note 73. 
68 Id. 
69 Loftus, supra note 65. 
70 Thomas Sullivan, The Park Doctrine and FDCA Violations: Holding Corporate Executives 
Accountable, Policy and Medicine (2011).  
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reported to the FDA.
71
  Although Synthes used the bone cement in 200 patients, surgeons 
could not rule out the bone cement as a factor one way or the other in the deaths of the 
patients.
72
  The patient deaths involving the off-label marketing scheme spurred the 
district court judge to immediately sentence the former president Michael Huggins and 
the former senior vice president Thomas Higgins to nine months in prison.
73
  The former 
director of regulatory and clinical affairs also received a five-month sentence. All four 
executives have irreparably damaged their careers and agreed to pay fines of $100,000 a 
piece.
74
 
Glaxo-Smith Kline Case 
In July 2012, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) entered into a settlement agreement with 
the Department of Justice for $3 billion dollars, the largest health care fraud settlement in 
the history of the life science industry
75
.  GSK was charged with civil and criminal 
violation under the Act and civil violations under the False Claim Act.  GSK’s liability 
stemmed from their failure to report safety data, false price reporting and their illegal 
marketing activities for several drugs, including Paxil, Avandia and Welbutrin.
76
  The 
government alleged that GSK unlawfully promoted Paxil for treating depression in 
patients under age 18, even though the FDA has never approved it for pediatric use.  GSK 
                                                        
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See John E. Kelly and Sarah K. Bogni, Government Expands Settlement Requirements, 
Entices Whistleblowers with $3 Billion GlaxoSmithKiline Settlement, BNA’s Health Care Fraud 
Report (2012). 
76 Press Release, United States Department of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and 
Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012). 
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also allegedly promoted Wellbutrin, approved at that time only for Major Depressive 
Disorder, for weight loss, the treatment of sexual dysfunction, substance addictions and 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, among other off-label uses. Additionally, GSK 
failed to include certain safety data about Avandia, a diabetes drug, in reports to the FDA. 
The FDA must have true and accurate safety information regarding an approved drug on 
the market because it is essential to ensuring the public’s safety.77 This case is unique in 
that the government did not bring an RCO action against company executives but did put 
in place a Corporate Integrity Agreement (“CIA”) that provides financial disincentives 
for company executives when there is misconduct.  Strangely, the government brought 
other non-RCO related charges against company executives, including the company’s 
general counsel.  The charges against the general counsel were dismissed by the circuit 
court judge because the government’s evidence was unsubstantiated.78  This case 
emphasized the problems the government may encounter when working across several 
agencies in their prosecutions.  
Under the CIA, GSK is required to change its executive compensation program to 
permit the company to recoup annual bonuses and long-term incentives from covered 
executives if they, or their subordinates, engage in significant misconduct.  GSK may 
recoup monies from executives who are current employees and those who have left the 
company.   Among other things, the CIA also requires GSK to implement and maintain 
transparency in its research practices and publication policies and to follow specified 
                                                        
77 Id. 
78 See Susan Kohn Ross, Case Against Former GSK Lawyer Dies-Park Doctrine Lives (June 10, 
2011). 
 17 
policies in its contracts with various health care payors. “Our five-year integrity 
agreement with GlaxoSmithKline requires individual accountability of its board and 
executives,” said Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. “For example, company executives may have to forfeit 
annual bonuses if they or their subordinates engage in significant misconduct, and sales 
agents are now being paid based on quality of service rather than sales targets.”79    
The government is focusing on individual accountability by requiring 
certifications of compliance by company boards, individual presidents, as well as key 
executives and managers of the company. By incorporating such widespread 
accountability across an organization, the government seems to believe the compliance 
certification will affect the way individuals do business in the company.
80
 We have seen 
similar measures implemented through Sarbanes Oxley Act. These settlement provisions 
may also be a way for the government to lay the groundwork for pursuing a future RCO 
claim. Whether the government treats CIA’s as a framework for future RCO claims or 
solely as an internal oversight tool of the company, the life sciences industry should 
expect to see more of these types of provisions in CIA’s as another means for the 
government to enforce individual liability of corporate executives.
81
  
                                                        
79 Supra note 76. 
80 Id. 
81 Supra note 75. 
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Corporate executives should be weary in the first instance mentioned above since 
CIA’s are entered into with the company.82  The individual employee may not be offered 
a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”). A DPA is when the government decides to 
decline further prosecution of a case based on certain requirements of the defendant, i.e. 
entering into a CIA.  The corporate executive should evaluate the potential consequences 
of their company entering into a CIA and their possible liability under RCO theory. 
The government has focused on other enforcement methods to complement its 
prosecution of corporate executives.  The government issued a release of non-binding 
Park doctrine criteria to determine whether to recommend a misdemeanor prosecution of 
a corporate official.
83
  There are seven factors that are enumerated: 
1. Whether the violation involves actual or potential harm to the public; 
2. Whether the violation is obvious; 
3. Whether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal behavior and/or failure to 
heed prior warnings; 
4. Whether the violation is widespread; 
5. Whether the violation is serious; 
6. The quality of the legal and factual support for the proposed prosecution; 
and 
7. Whether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of agency resources. 
                                                        
82 Press Release, United States Department of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and 
Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012). 
83 Regulatory Procedures Manual, Special Procedures and Considerations for Park Doctrine 
Prosecutions, 6-5-3 (2011).  
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This release can be interpreted as good or bad news for pharmaceutical 
executives.  On the one hand, there is clarification by the government on what types of 
situations are going to cause them to seek exclusion of a corporate executive. On the 
other hand, the release reiterated the government’s position and dedication to prosecuting 
RCO cases.  Corporate executives can now be targeted as part of an investigation of their 
companies alleged misconduct.  In fact in the Purdue case discussed previously, the 
parent company was able to limit the allegations of misbranding to the subsidiary and 
escaped exclusion from federal health care programs. The parent company paid the large 
fine of $634.5 million in penalties but did not suffer the long-term consequence of 
exclusion.
84
  Executives can be prosecuted for a misdemeanor violation of the Act and 
not have any knowledge of the alleged bad acts of the company. The executives who may 
or may not have had any direct knowledge of wrongdoing became the face of the 
companies’ wrongdoing.  Pharmaceutical company executives must ensure some 
protection from their employers against possible prosecution under the RCO doctrine. 
The interpretation of the Park doctrine as a strict liability statute creates a significant risk 
of liability for these executives.  
The pharmaceutical industry is going to have difficulty fulfilling corporate 
executive positions, compliance positions and even legal positions because of the 
implications of the Park doctrine. There is no specific boundary as to who can be held 
liable. Even legal counsel can be subject to these prosecutions.
85
 One area an executive 
can seek protection is in negotiating RCO protections into their employment agreements. 
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An executive can seek indemnification from their employer if prosecuted under the Park 
doctrine. This indemnification should survive an employment termination. An executive 
should consult their director and officer liability policies and seek coverage for RCO 
liabilities. Lastly, and most importantly an executive should ensure that the companies 
compliance program is closely monitored and audited.  
The OIG believes that a robust compliance program is going to prevent many of 
the potential illegal activities associated with healthcare fraud and abuse. In 2003, DHHS 
issued the first release of “OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers”.86 The compliance program guidance provides an initial step for 
pharmaceutical companies to adhere to the applicable statutes, rules and regulations 
related to the healthcare industry.  
There are seven elements that are fundamental to an effective compliance 
program for pharmaceutical manufacturers. There must be (a) written policies and 
procedures, (b) a designated compliance officer and compliance committee, (c) an 
effective training and education component, (d) an effective communication program, (e) 
an internal auditing and monitoring program, (f) enforcement of standards through well 
publicized disciplinary guidelines and (g) a program that responds promptly and resolves 
detected problems.
87
 In many instances, when the OIG is investigating a pharmaceutical 
company for healthcare fraud and abuse, they will first evaluate the type of compliance 
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program in place within the company.
88
 It is imperative that the life science industry 
commits significant resources to developing and maintaining a robust compliance 
program. A meaningful compliance program will deter fraud and abuse practices within a 
company as well as protect senior executives from potential liability under the Park 
doctrine. 
Executives should have an intimate understanding of the potential liabilities for 
fraud and abuse in the operations of their company.  Monitoring specific risk areas 
associated with company operations should be the cornerstone of a compliance program.  
A prudent pharmaceutical manufacturer will assess the risk areas of their operations with 
regard to the various healthcare fraud and abuse laws.
89
 The compliance officer should 
directly monitor these specific risk areas.  Any executive that could potentially prevent 
fraud and abuse in a risk area should require a weekly risk assessment report from the 
compliance officer.  If an executive is directly involved in the compliance monitoring 
there is a better chance of detecting and correcting illegal activities.   
In addition to a sophisticated compliance program, a life science company should 
also employ a quality control program that is supervised by upper management.  Senior 
executives should consider implementing the following quality control measures: 
1. “Regular meetings with subordinates involved in quality issues to review 
existing and new quality problems. 
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2. Carefully-crafted procedures requiring written notification and periodic 
updates on quality problems. 
3. Insuring the firm has a robust CAPA – Corrective and Preventive Action- 
program that features stringent timelines for conducting investigations and taking 
corrective actions. 
4. A well-conceived and regularly occurring internal audit program designed 
to identify suspect operations and controls before they blossom into actual issues. 
5. Use of outside auditors to review operations even absent problems 
identified in internal audits.”90 
Although many of the day-to-day activities, of quality control and compliance are 
done by subordinates, executives should at least receive at least weekly monitoring 
updates.  Delegation of responsibility will not insulate executives from liability under the 
Park doctrine. In fact, the one affirmative defense that an executive can assert is to show 
that they were powerless to prevent the violation from occurring.
91
  
The government has mandated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“PPACA”) that all healthcare providers and suppliers implement compliance 
programs as a condition of Medicare enrollment.
92
 Until this new statutory provision, 
compliance programs were entirely voluntary. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) is conducting a comment period on defining core elements for the 
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mandated compliance program.
93
 It is likely CMS will build on the seven core 
compliance guidelines promoted by the OIG.  Any variations may be determined by the 
responses submitted during the comment period for the new regulation.  Perhaps the 
government will attempt to institute a provision whereby executive compensation 
packages are aligned with performance and compliance with healthcare laws. 
Conclusion 
The government has broadly interpreted the Park doctrine in commencing 
enforcement actions under the Act.  The Park doctrine has been recently tested in several 
cases, including the Purdue case, the Synthes case and the Glaxo-Smith Kline case.  It 
appears that the government has been successful in applying the Park doctrine to 
corporate executives under a strict liability theory.  The government has also been 
successful in applying the exclusion statute to Park doctrine cases in order to emphasize 
the importance of protecting consumer safety.  The government will continue to attribute 
resources and increase enforcement in this area as long as the monetary recoveries 
continue to rise.  We have seen with the GlaxoSmithKline case that recoveries are 
reaching $3 billion.  
Executives in the life science industry face substantial challenges in exerting 
control over areas of risk for fraud and abuse violations.  These executives must preserve 
protections for themselves through negotiating additional liability insurance and 
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indemnification provisions in their employment contracts.  Executives should also 
maintain direct oversight of their quality control and compliance programs.  Executives 
should be prepared to negotiate compensation based on performance.  The government 
has already required some companies through CIA’s to allow reduction of bonuses from 
executives when there is significant misconduct. 
The amount of healthcare fraud and abuse violations still remains staggering.  The 
government is utilizing many different types of governance tools to enforce the laws. In 
addition, the life science industry is also utilizing governance tools of self-regulation and 
robust compliance programs to dissuade fraud and abuse violations.  These various 
governance tactics should continue to be used and with continued vigilance until 
individuals and corporations have met their threshold and are adequately deterred.   
 
